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LAWYERS’ RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER TITLE
III OF THE ADA: ENSURING
COMMUNICATION ACCESS FOR THE DEAF
AND HARD OF HEARING
Elana Nightingale Dawson*
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act requires
that public accommodations provide the auxiliary aid or
service necessary to ensure effective communication with the
deaf and hard of hearing. Lawyers’ offices are among the
many locations and services covered by Title III.
Unfortunately, many lawyers are unaware of this fact.
Furthermore, as currently designed, the ADA creates little
opportunity for the rights afforded by Title III to be
successfully enforced against lawyers.
This reality is
particularly problematic for the deaf and hard of hearing
community. The auxiliary aid or service necessary to
accommodate a deaf or hard of hearing client often requires an
out-of-pocket expense on the part of her attorney. In a world
where lawyers are accustomed to passing on client-related
costs to the client, the idea of absorbing such costs is
antithetical.
This Article looks at the history and
implementation of Title III to explain why its effectiveness has
been limited within the legal profession. It also explores the
realities facing deaf and hard of hearing people seeking legal
representation. Finally, this Article proposes a detailed threepronged approach to free Title III from its current state of
paralysis. First, lawyers must know their obligations to deaf
and hard of hearing clients. Second, financial resources must
be set aside to pay for the auxiliary aid or service required.
Third, both Congress and the Court must take action to
change the current remedies available under Title III.
Progress must be made on all of these fronts in order for Title
III to be the tool Congress intended.

Candidate for Juris Doctor Degree, Northwestern University School of Law, 2011. The
author thanks Howard Rosenblum, Debra Lefler, Colleen McNamara, and Danielle Levine
for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. The author would also like to thank Joshua
Reece and the editors of the Valparaiso University Law Review for their invaluable editorial
contributions. The views expressed, and any misstatements, are solely those of the author.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly ten million Americans are hard of hearing and almost one
million are functionally deaf.1 The Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”) is designed not only to cover the approximately eleven million
deaf and hard of hearing Americans, but also the almost fifty million
Americans with recognizable disabilities.2 As Senator Larry E. Craig
pointed out, “[t]he ADA is truly vast in its scope.”3 The ADA’s coverage
of public accommodations, as provided for in Title III of the Act, reaches
even farther than the analogous portion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(“CRA”),4 which prohibits racial discrimination in public
accommodations. Professional offices, such as those of a lawyer, are one
such entity that is specifically named in the ADA but not in the CRA.5
Despite its broad aspirations, Title III does not adequately protect the
rights of deaf and hard of hearing people who seek legal services. A
person who is deaf or hard of hearing may need an interpreter, notetaker, or other accommodation in order to fully benefit from a lawyer’s
services. But these accommodations can be expensive, which makes
lawyers reluctant to provide them at their own cost. Additionally,
lawyers have no incentive to comply with Title III’s requirements
because they are unlikely to suffer any consequences from not
complying with the law. Title III’s coverage of a lawyer’s office creates a
catch-22 for deaf and hard of hearing people who encounter an
inaccessible attorney. Title III only allows for injunctive relief in private
actions.6 The deaf or hard of hearing person must sue their own attorney
in order to force the attorney to comply with Title III. If they find a new
attorney, they no longer have standing to sue the non-compliant
attorney. Needless to say, suing one’s own attorney is not the best way
to foster an attorney-client relationship.

Ross E. Mitchell, How Many Deaf People Are There in the United States? Estimates from
the Survey of Income and Program Participation, 11 J. DEAF STUD. & DEAF EDUC. 112, 112 (2006).
2
See JUDITH WALDROP & SHARON M. STERN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DISABILITY STATUS:
2000 1 (2003) (“Census 2000 counted 49.7 million people with some type of long lasting
condition or disability.”). The number of people covered under the ADA has likely
increased significantly in light of the recently adopted amendments to the ADA that
expand the definition of disability. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-325, 122
Stat. 3553 (rejecting various Supreme Court decisions that limited the definition of
disability under the ADA).
3
Larry E. Craig, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Prologue, Promise, Product, and
Performance, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 205, 212 (1999).
4
42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (2006).
5
Id. § 12181(7)(F).
6
Id. § 12188(a)(1)–(2).
1
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Because most ADA scholarship focuses on the ADA’s employment
discrimination provision, Title I, many solutions to ADA-related
problems are framed from an employment discrimination perspective.7
Numerous commentators have assumed that these solutions will resolve
the challenges faced under all Titles of the ADA.8 Professor Michael
Waterstone challenges this assumption, arguing that Title II and Title
III’s success has been limited as the result of their enforcement
mechanisms.9 This Article takes Waterstone’s argument one step further.
Just as Title I arguments do not always translate neatly into Title II and
Title III contexts, accommodations required for one disabled population
will not always sufficiently accommodate other disabled populations.
Furthermore, within Title III, different public accommodations present
different challenges to ADA enforcement. Title III covers a broad array
of entities, from hotels to hospitals to grocery stores, thus limiting the
success of the one-size-fits-all approach to regulations and remedies
utilized by Title III.10
This Article begins to fill the gap in ADA scholarship by focusing on
one place of public accommodation and its accessibility to one disabled
population.11 Like much of the ADA, Title III has a lot of promise, but
without change, it will never accomplish its ultimate goals. Title III’s
shortcomings become very clear when looking at how Title III works in
reality, as opposed to how it looks on paper. This Article argues that
Title III is ineffective in regulating lawyers and thus leaves the deaf and
hard of hearing unrepresented and potentially discriminated against
even further. Title III has not resulted in the voluntary compliance
Congress hoped for,12 as evidenced by the difficulties that deaf and hard
of hearing individuals face when attempting to obtain counsel.13
7
Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 58
VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1809 (2005).
8
Id. at 1809–10.
9
Id. at 1810.
10
See infra Part III (explaining why Title III is a “servant to many masters” and
examining the entities it covers).
11
See infra notes 37–39 and accompanying text (introducing the statutory definition of
“place of public accommodation” and explaining that a lawyer fits within this definition).
12
NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT: CHALLENGES, BEST PRACTICES, AND NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR SUCCESS 179–85 (2007)
[hereinafter NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, IMPLEMENTATION] (discussing the “[r]easons for
[w]idespread [n]oncompliance with Title III”); see also 136 CONG. REC. 17,376 (1990)
(statement of Sen. Robert Dole) (exemplifying congressional expectation that the ADA
remedies would result in less discrimination when stating that “[t]he tough but fair
enforcement remedies of ADA, which parallel the Civil Rights Act of 1964, are time-tested
incentives for compliance and disincentives for discrimination”).
13
NAD Advocacy Statement: Communication Access Funds for Legal Services, NAT’L ASS’N
OF
THE
DEAF,
http://www.nad.org/issues/justice/lawyers-and-legal-services/
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First, Part II discusses the history of the ADA’s passage and briefly
summarizes the final version of Title III. In doing so, it shows how the
ADA’s history contributed to the current failure of Title III to effectively
serve the deaf and hard of hearing population attempting to obtain legal
counsel. Then, Part III explains how and why Title III has fallen short of
its main goal—“to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable
standards addressing discrimination [by public accommodations]
against individuals with disabilities.”14 Next, Part IV proposes a threepart solution that will begin to free Title III from its current state of
paralysis. And finally, Part V concludes by explaining how the
implementation of the proposed three-part solution and continued focus
on the challenges facing the deaf and hard of hearing trying to obtain
counsel can help to move Title III exponentially closer to the lifechanging legislation it was intended to be.
II. HOW WE GOT HERE: THE ADA & TITLE III
On July 26, 1990, then-President George H. W. Bush signed the ADA
into law, declaring: “Let the shameful wall of exclusion finally come
tumbling down.”15 The enactment of the ADA marked the beginning of
a new era for the disability civil rights movement. The ADA’s goal was
to provide social and economic equality for the disabled, leading some
Senators to call it the “Emancipation Proclamation for all persons with
disabilities.”16
The ADA’s road to passage was not entirely smooth. While it was
still moving through Congress, Senator Tom Harkin introduced a
revised version of the ADA. Included in Senator Harkin’s ADA draft
were two important changes to Title III. First, the definition of public
accommodations was broadened to include “all privately operated
establishments ‘that are used by the general public as customers, clients,

communication-access-funds (last visited Oct. 18, 2010) [hereinafter NAD Advocacy
Statement] (“People who are deaf continue to encounter significant communication barriers
when attempting to obtain private legal services and representation . . . .”) (footnote
omitted).
14
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (2006).
15
PETER BLANCK ET AL., DISABILITY CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND POLICY xxxiv (2004).
16
136 CONG. REC. 17,369 (1990) (statement of Sen. Tom Harkin) (“The ADA is, indeed,
the 20th century Emancipation Proclamation for all persons with disabilities.”); see also 135
CONG. REC. 19,888 (1989) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy) (describing the ADA in
similar terms, when he said, “In a sense, this legislation is an emancipation proclamation
for the disabled, and America will be better.”).
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or visitors; or that are potential places of employment.’”17 Second,
compensatory damages were made available as a remedy in private
actions, with relief modeled after the relief available under the Fair
Housing Act (“FHA”).18
Senator Harkin’s changes, however, brought about concern and
opposition. Most notably, the Bush Administration stated that it would
only agree to expansive coverage of private and public entities under
Title III if remedies were limited to injunctive relief for private actions,
the same remedy available under the CRA.19 In order to ensure
continued bipartisan support while maintaining Title III’s broader reach,
legislators reached a compromise20—Title III remedies for private actions
would mirror those available under section 2000a-3 of the CRA. 21
Senator Edward Kennedy noted his concern with a remedial scheme
that only allowed for injunctive relief in private actions, stating “we have
seen in the past that where we do not provide an adequate remedy we
do not get compliance.”22 According to Senator Kennedy, both the thenPresident and Attorney General promised to support making the
remedies stronger if they were not effective.23 In defense of the new
remedies, Senator Bob Dole asserted that “[t]he tough but fair
enforcement remedies of [the] ADA, which parallel the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, are time-tested incentives for compliance and disincentives for
discrimination.”24
Congressional proponents of using the CRA remedial approach for
the ADA believed it would be adequate simply because of its success in

RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST DECADE OF THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT 33 (2005) [hereinafter COLKER, DISABILITY PENDULUM] (quoting S. 933,
101st Cong. § 401(2)(A)(i) (1989)).
18
Id.
19
Craig, supra note 3, at 215–16.
20
COLKER, DISABILITY PENDULUM, supra note 17, at 173; see also 135 CONG. REC. 19,803
(1989) (statement of Sen. Tom Harkin) (referring to the “cutback [of] the remedies included
in the original bill in exchange for a broad scope of coverage under the public
accommodations title of the bill” as a “fragile compromise”).
21
The Civil Rights Act provides remedies as follows:
[w]henever any person has engaged or there are reasonable grounds to
believe that any person is about to engage in any act or practice
prohibited . . . , a civil action for preventive relief, including an
application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order,
or other order, may be instituted by the person aggrieved.
42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (2006).
22
135 CONG. REC. 19,841 (1989).
23
See id. (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy) (referencing the need in 1988 to revisit the
1968 Fair Housing Act because inadequate remedies resulted in a lack of compliance).
24
136 CONG. REC. 17,376 (1990) (statement of Sen. Robert Dole).
17
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the CRA.25 Those who initially advocated for stronger remedies, such as
those available under the FHA, acquiesced to the compromise on
remedies in the interest of getting the entire ADA, including broad
public accommodation coverage under Title III, passed.26 Then-Attorney
General Richard Thornburgh did, however, note that reevaluation of the
ADA over time would be necessary in order to determine whether it was
effective as initially passed.27
While ultimately receiving bipartisan support, the final version of
the ADA was “the result of extensive scrutiny, debate, and compromise
involving Members of Congress, the administration, and the business
Because of the compromises and
and disability communities.”28
negotiations necessary to get the Act through Congress,
“straightforwardness and clarity ultimately gave way to political reality,
requiring some disingenuousness.”29 The result, suggests Professor
Bonnie Poitras Tucker, was “a law that many courts view as sending
conflicting messages.”30
The ADA version finally passed by Congress had three main
focuses:
disability-based discrimination by employers,31 the
32
government,
and public accommodations.33
Disability-based
discrimination by employers, prohibited by Title I, is the most litigated
Title of the ADA and, not surprisingly, has received the most scholarly
attention.34 Some scholars have referred to Title I as being “[a]t the heart
of the promise of the ADA.”35 The scarcity of scholarship focusing on
Title II and Title III, however, does not suggest that these Titles have
achieved complete success. Instead, the overwhelming focus on the
ADA’s employment provisions has simply placed that provision more
firmly on the public’s consciousness.
Title III requires public accommodations to take the steps necessary
to ensure access for people with disabilities.36 A public accommodation,
COLKER, DISABILITY PENDULUM, supra note 17, at 174.
Id. at 172–74.
27
Id. at 174.
28
136 CONG. REC. 17,366 (1990) (statement of Sen. Tom Harkin).
29
Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The ADA’s Revolving Door: Inherent Flaws in the Civil Rights
Paradigm, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 340 (2001).
30
Id.
31
42 U.S.C. §§ 12112–12117 (2006).
32
Id. §§ 12131–12165.
33
Id. §§ 12181–12189.
34
Waterstone, Untold Story, supra note 7, at 1809.
35
BLANCK, supra note 15, at 2–28.
36
When prohibiting discrimination, Title III states that such prohibited action includes
a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no
individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or
25
26
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under Title III, is any private entity included in one of the twelve listed
categories whose operations affect commerce.37 The “office of an
accountant or lawyer” is included in the definition.38 Therefore, lawyers
must provide auxiliary aids or services to any deaf or hard of hearing
client, unless doing so would prove an undue burden.39 An auxiliary aid
or service is required when it is “necessary to ensure effective
communication with individuals with disabilities.”40 Like any public
accommodation, lawyers cannot pass along the cost of an auxiliary aid or
service to the disabled person.41
Auxiliary aids and services include a wide variety of
accommodations. Appropriate auxiliary aids and services for the deaf
and hard of hearing usually include “[q]ualified interpreters, notetakers,
[and] computer-aided transcription services.”42 The Title III regulations
define a qualified interpreter as “an interpreter who is able to interpret
effectively, accurately and impartially both receptively and expressively,
using any necessary specialized vocabulary.”43 The definition of the
term “[q]ualified interpreter” is important because people often

otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the
absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can
demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the
nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or
accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).
37
Id. § 12181(7)(A)–(F).
38
Id. § 12181(7)(F).
39
Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).
40
28 C.F.R. § 36.303(c) (2009).
41
Id. § 36.301(c).
42
Id. § 36.303(b)(1). In full, the regulation states the following:
The term “auxiliary aids and services” includes—
(1)
Qualified
interpreters,
notetakers,
computer-aided
transcription services, written materials, telephone handset amplifiers,
assistive listening devices, assistive listening systems, telephones
compatible with hearing aids, closed caption decoders, open and
closed captioning, telecommunications devices for deaf persons
(TDD’s), videotext displays, or other effective methods of making
aurally delivered materials available to individuals with hearing
impairments;
(2) Qualified readers, taped texts, audio recordings, Brailled
materials, large print materials, or other effective methods of making
visually delivered materials available to individuals with visual
impairments;
(3) Acquisition or modification of equipment or devices; and
(4) Other similar services and actions.
Id. § 36.303(b).
43
Id. § 36.104.
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misunderstand the important role that an interpreter plays, leading them
to think that friends or family members are appropriate interpreters.44
Lawyers must provide these auxiliary aids or services unless they
can demonstrate that the required accommodation will cause them an
undue burden or will fundamentally alter the goods or services offered
by the attorney. However, the provision of communication access
ordinarily does not give rise to a fundamental alteration defense.45 The
only defense available to an otherwise successful Title III claim is a
showing that the required accommodation or modification will result in
an undue burden on the lawyer. Moreover, a public accommodation
cannot claim that an accommodation is an undue burden simply because
the public accommodation is small, such as a solo practitioner.46 “Undue
burden,” in the context of Title III, has been defined as a “significant
difficulty or expense.”47 Even if a lawyer has a legitimate undue burden
defense, they are still obligated to provide an alternate option for
accessibility.48 Various factors determine whether an accommodation
44
28 C.F.R. pt. 36, App. B, at 684–85 (2005) (describing the qualifications of family and
friends as interpreters). The appendix states:
Public comment also revealed that public accommodations have at
times asked persons who are deaf to provide family members or
friends to interpret. In certain circumstances, notwithstanding that the
family member or friend is able to interpret or is a certified interpreter,
the family member or friend may not be qualified to render the
necessary interpretation because of factors such as emotional or
personal involvement or considerations of confidentiality that may
adversely affect the ability to interpret “effectively, accurately, and
impartially.”
Id.
45
The fundamental alteration exception to Title III’s requirements usually arises in the
context of a policy modification or significant programmatic change. See, e.g., Robert L.
Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a SecondGeneration Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 475 (1991) (Under Title III’s
fundamental alteration exception, courts have not required alterations in the following
situations: “if they would endanger a program’s viability; ‘massive’ or ‘extremely
expensive’ changes are not required; modifications involving a ‘major restructuring’ of an
enterprise or that ‘jeopardize the effectiveness’ of a program are not required;
modifications are not required if they would so alter an enterprise as to create, in effect, a
new program.” (footnotes omitted)).
46
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2006) (defining the term “public accommodation” in
Title III without referencing size of any entity prohibited from discriminating based on
disability), with id. § 12111(5)(A) (defining “employer” in Title I so as to exempt employers
with fifteen or fewer employees from liability for disability discrimination).
47
28 C.F.R. § 36.104.
48
Id. § 36.303(f). The regulation states:
If provision of a particular auxiliary aid or service by a public
accommodation would result in . . . an undue burden, i.e., significant
difficulty or expense, the public accommodation shall provide an
alternative auxiliary aid or service, if one exists, that would not result
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qualifies as an undue burden, including the type of auxiliary aid needed
and the lawyer’s overall financial resources.49 If an attorney invokes the
undue burden defense, the alleged undue burden must be measured
against the financial health of the lawyer’s (or firm’s) entire practice—not
in light of the income earned from the disabled client.50 An undue
burden does not exist simply because an attorney might lose money on a
disabled client due to the cost of an auxiliary aid or service required by
Title III.51
If, however, a lawyer has no undue burden defense and is found
liable for a Title III violation, he is unlikely to be punished for this
violation because of the compromise Congress made limiting the
penalties for Title III violations.52 Under Title III, if one pursues a private
cause of action, it must be for “preventive relief, including an application
in . . . such burden but would nevertheless ensure that, to the
maximum extent possible, individuals with disabilities receive the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations
offered by the public accommodation.
Id.
49

Id. § 36.104. The regulation delineates undue burden factors as follows:
Undue burden means significant difficulty or expense. In determining
whether an action would result in an undue burden, factors to be
considered include—
(1) The nature and cost of the action needed under this part;
(2) The overall financial resources of the site or sites involved in
the action; the number of persons employed at the site; the effect on
expenses and resources; legitimate safety requirements that are
necessary for safe operation, including crime prevention measures; or
the impact otherwise of the action upon the operation of the site;
(3) The geographic separateness, and the administrative or fiscal
relationship of the site or sites in question to any parent corporation or
entity;
(4) If applicable, the overall financial resources of any parent
corporation or entity; the overall size of the parent corporation or
entity with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type,
and location of its facilities; and
(5) If applicable, the type of operation or operations of any parent
corporation or entity, including the composition, structure, and
functions of the workforce of the parent corporation or entity.

Id.
See Eric Maxfield, Sign Language Interpreters: Who Pays?, COLO. LAW., Apr. 2004, at 29,
32 (noting that an attorney must provide an interpreter in a pro bono case “unless such
provision would cause an undue burden,” and that “whether a client is paying or
represented pro bono is irrelevant”); see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (outlining the undue burden
factors).
51
See Victoria Chase & Kate Reznick, Business Law: Serving the Deaf Client, PHILA. LAW.,
Summer 2004, http://www.philadelphiabar.org/page/TPLSummer04DealClient?app
Num=2 (last visited Jan. 15, 2011).
52
See supra text accompanying notes 19–21 (explaining the remedies compromise
reached in order to retain support for Title III).
50
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for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other
order.”53 A deaf or hard of hearing client suing his or her attorney for
injunctive relief is trying to obtain a court order (injunction) forcing the
attorney to provide the auxiliary aid or service, or a reasonable
alternative, necessary for effective communication.54 While Title I and
Title II allow for monetary damages in private actions,55 Title III only
allows monetary damages in claims brought by the Attorney General.56
When the Attorney General pursues a Title III claim, compensatory
damages are capped at $50,000 for the first violation and $100,000 for any
subsequent violations.57 Punitive damages are never recoverable under
Title III.58
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) is the government agency
responsible for Title III complaint investigation.59 The DOJ also
undertakes compliance review of entities covered by Title III.60 The DOJ
does not investigate every complaint they receive. Instead, the DOJ has
complete discretion over whether to investigate complaints and will do
so only “[w]here the Department has reason to believe that there may be
a violation.”61 The DOJ will only bring a civil action when it believes
there is a pattern or practice of discrimination or where the
discrimination “raises an issue of general public importance.”62 When
the DOJ is involved in a claim, they have dramatically higher proplaintiff results (49.9%) than in cases that lack DOJ involvement
(27.8%).63 However, the DOJ appears to be decreasing the number of
complaints it investigates.64
III. TITLE III TODAY
Title III is a servant to many masters. In addition to regulating a
wide variety of public accommodations, it also aims to make public
42 U.S.C § 2000a-3(a) (2006).
See id. (describing a civil action under Title III).
55
Id. §§ 12117(a), 12133.
56
Id. § 12188(b)(2)(B); DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: TITLE III
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, COVERING PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS AND COMMERCIAL
FACILITIES III-8.4000 (1993), available at http://www.ada.gov/taman3.html [hereinafter DOJ
TITLE III MANUAL].
57
42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(2)(C).
58
Id. § 12188(b)(4).
59
DOJ TITLE III MANUAL, supra note 56, at III-8.3000.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. at III-8.1000.
63
NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 12, at 168 (quoting
Waterstone, Untold Story, supra note 7, at 1874).
64
Id.
53
54
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accommodations accessible to the entire disabled population. The
statutory design necessary to compel McDonald’s to provide a ramp for
its wheelchair bound customers will not necessarily compel an attorney
to provide a sign language interpreter for his deaf client. The following
section discusses how Title III is designed.
This section also
demonstrates why Title III’s ability to regulate lawyers’ offices has been
necessarily limited.
A. Accommodation Mandate and the Cost of Compliance
The crux of Title III is its “accommodation mandate.”65 An
accommodation mandate exists when a party is required to “take special
steps in response to the distinctive needs of particular, identifiable
demographic groups.”66 Title III’s accommodation mandate requires
public accommodations to make “reasonable modifications” to their
policies, practices and procedures as well as taking “such steps as may
be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded,
[or] denied services.”67
Critiques of the ADA’s accommodation
mandates, which question whether an accommodation mandate is the
appropriate way to create accessibility, focus almost exclusively on Title
I.68 Critics of Title I contend that accommodations requiring ongoing
financial commitment are economically inefficient and thus economically
flawed.69 Economic inefficiency occurs when a market participant is
forced to do something he or she does not view as profitable or
beneficial.70 Under Title I, the market participant is the employer. If
employers believe that disabled workers require costly accommodations
in order to perform their jobs effectively, we would expect employers to
choose to hire nondisabled employees, absent regulations to the
contrary.71 Title I’s accommodation mandate is also seen as shifting the
burden of paying for accommodations from the government to private
entities.72 Some scholars have questioned whether it makes sense to
place the cost for providing accommodations on employers.73 Some also
Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 223 (2000).
Id. at 231.
67
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)–(iii) (2006).
68
See id. § 12112(b)(5) (requiring employers, under Title I’s accommodation mandate, to
provide reasonable accommodations to an identifiable demographic group—the disabled).
69
Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability Accommodations, 53 DUKE L.J.
79, 83–84 (2003).
70
Id. at 120.
71
Id.
72
BLANCK, supra note 15, at 2–29.
73
See Waterstone, Untold Story, supra note 7, at 1848 (“[C]ommentators have argued that
the accommodation mandate is economically flawed (or at least of limited utility) in the
65
66

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 3 [2011], Art. 8

1154 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

worry that the cost of accommodating a disabled worker discourages
employers from hiring disabled workers in the first place, despite the
ADA’s clear prohibition against disability-based discrimination.74
Many of the critiques of Title I’s accommodation mandate also
pertain to Title III. However, Title III’s accommodation mandates have
gotten little scholarly attention. Professor Michael Waterstone suggests
that this is because Title III’s mandate is not as theoretically troubling as
the mandate of Title I.75 Accommodation requests under Title III “are
often less personal and can apply to a range of customers.”76 As of 2005,
there were very few Title III cases decided on the grounds that the
accommodation presented an undue burden to the defendant,
suggesting that most Title III accommodations require a reasonable onetime expense.77 PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin further supports the belief that
the modifications required under Title III impose minimal, if any, costs
on the public accommodation.78 In PGA Tour, Casey Martin, who had a
circulatory disorder, requested the use of a golf cart during a PGA
tournament, despite the tournament’s rule against golf cart use.79 When
the Supreme Court sided with Martin, the PGA Tour simply had to make
an exception to their rule.80 Likewise, most of Title III’s more visible
successes are the result of one-time expenditures: elevators and ramps in
new buildings, wheelchair accessible tables at Starbucks, and ATM
machines with Braille.
Missing from this analysis is the fact that accommodations under
Title III typically take two forms: physical access and communication
access. Physical access encompasses those items that people usually
associate with the ADA—ramps, curb cuts, and elevators.81 Most
physical access accommodations require a one-time outlay of funds and,

employment sphere.”); see also Stein, supra note 69, at 14478 (discussing the level of
efficiency achieved by requiring employers to provide varying levels of accommodations).
74
Jolls, supra note 65, at 275–76.
75
Waterstone, Untold Story, supra note 7, at 1852.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 1852–53.
78
532 U.S. 661 (2001).
79
Id. at 668–69.
80
Id. at 690.
81
Most Title II and Title III scholarship does not distinguish between physical access
and communication access requirements, focusing solely on the requirement that public
accommodations remove physical barriers. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Perversity of
Limited Civil Rights Remedies: The Case of “Abusive” ADA Litigation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1
(2006) (focusing on physical accommodation requirements under the ADA); Michael
Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REV. 434, 47478 (2007)
[hereinafter Waterstone, New Vision] (discussing physical access cases involving public
accommodations).
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thereafter, require little if any expense.82 Communication access, on the
other hand, often requires an ongoing financial commitment, which is
more analogous to the types of expenses incurred by employers covered
by Title I. As such, many of the Title I accommodation mandate critiques
also apply to Title III.
Title III’s accommodation mandate, like Title I’s, can also be seen as
shifting the cost of accommodations from the government to private
entities, such as lawyers, particularly with respect to the deaf and hard of
hearing. Most auxiliary aids and services provided pursuant to Title III
must be financed each time the disabled consumer utilizes the public
accommodation’s services.83 A deaf patient who uses sign language
needs a sign language interpreter for every doctor’s appointment.
Moreover, the “less personal” element of Title III accommodations to
which Waterstone refers disappears when a public accommodation must
provide services to a deaf or hard of hearing patron.84 Furthermore, an
auxiliary aid for the deaf does not always benefit a “range of
customers.”85 All things being equal, a lawyer is just as likely to refuse to
take on a deaf or hard of hearing client as an employer is to refuse to hire
them. The economics are the same—when one choice requires an
additional, ongoing expense, there is no reason to expect a person to
voluntarily make the more expensive choice.
Title III’s accommodation mandate, when considered alongside its
weak remedial scheme, disincentivizes voluntary compliance by
attorneys who have deaf or hard of hearing clients. Voluntary
compliance is influenced by two things: the cost of compliance and the
risk of noncompliance. The higher the cost, the greater the risk must be
in order to achieve voluntary compliance and vice versa. However,
when the cost of complying with an accommodation mandate is high and
there is very little risk associated with noncompliance, the public
accommodation has very little incentive to abide by Title III.
Title III compliance by lawyers is expensive and the risks associated
with noncompliance are low. Therefore, all things being equal, it will
generally make less economic sense for a lawyer to take on a deaf or
hard of hearing client instead of a hearing non-disabled client. Lawyers
82
See Bagenstos, supra note 81, at 7 (noting that, with respect to barrier removal and
physical access, “[s]upporters of the ADA frequently contend that the statute’s requirement
of accessible public accommodations serves the interests of business by opening up a new
market . . . [a]nd [that] the ADA’s requirements in this context are not particularly costly”).
83
See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2006) (“The term ‘auxiliary aids and services’
includes . . . qualified interpreters or other effective methods of making aurally delivered
materials available to individuals with hearing impairments . . . .”).
84
Waterstone, Untold Story, supra note 7, at 1852.
85
Id.
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are also in a unique position which allows them to avoid disabled clients
simply by saying they do not have time.86 Moreover, because Title III
does not allow for monetary damages in private suits, the potential cost
of noncompliance is low.87 Compensatory damages, however, are
available when the DOJ pursues a claim. Yet, this does not happen
frequently enough to realistically incentivize compliance.88 Nor does the
cost of litigating an ADA claim incentivize compliance. The only
litigation cost risk a public accommodation bears is its own costs.89 Title
III’s accommodation mandate has little chance of success without
increased enforcement and a compensatory damages remedy.
B. Government Enforcement of Title III
According to a recent National Council on Disability report, “Title III
is overwhelmingly underenforced.”90 Critics have called the DOJ’s
enforcement of Title III “overly cautious, reactive, and lacking any
coherent and unifying national strategy.”91 In fact, the DOJ “has devoted
‘only a small cadre of lawyers’ to disability rights enforcement, and those
lawyers must shoulder responsibility for enforcing the ADA against state
and local governments as well as against private businesses.”92 As a
result, the DOJ’s Disability Rights Section makes “decisions . . . not to
open for investigation a large proportion of [public accommodations]
complaints received,” which explains why there is a relatively low
number of public accommodation enforcement actions.93 Thus attorneys
who refuse to provide auxiliary aids and services to deaf and hard of
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 cmt. (2010) (“A lawyer should not accept
representation in a matter unless it can be performed competently, promptly, without
improper conflict of interest and to completion.”). Therefore, a lawyer can avoid
representing a client simply by saying they are too busy, in which case they are obligated,
under Rules of Professional Conduct, to decline representation.
87
See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
88
See infra Part III.B.
89
See infra Part III.C.
90
NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 12, at 12. The National
Council on Disability is “an independent federal agency making recommendations to the
President and Congress on issues affecting 54 million Americans with disabilities.” Office
of Civil Rights, Disability Resources, DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, http://www.doi.gov/
diversity/8able2.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2010). See generally Jonathan Young, Living,
Learning, and Earning Forums, NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, http://www.ncd.gov/ (last
visited Jan. 24, 2011) (describing the Council’s objectives through the eyes of its Chairman).
91
Waterstone, New Vision, supra note 81, at 458–59.
92
Bagenstos, supra note 81, at 9.
93
NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, PROMISES TO KEEP: A DECADE OF FEDERAL
ENFORCEMENT OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 38 (2000), available at
(alterations
in
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2000/promises_1.htm
original).
86
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hearing clients have little fear of DOJ action—certainly not enough
necessary to effect change.
There are two primary reasons for the DOJ’s lack of effectiveness in
the Title III enforcement arena. First, Congress has provided limited
resources for DOJ enforcement of ADA violations.94 Second, and more
importantly, the ADA does not require the DOJ to pursue every Title III
complaint it receives.95 The DOJ need not pursue a Title III complaint
unless it finds ‘“a pattern or practice’ of discrimination or ‘an issue of
general public importance.’”96 The lack of an enforcement mandate,
coupled with the DOJ’s limited resources, results in a “focus[] on large,
high profile commercial defendants, and [an] emphasi[s on] settlements
and consent decrees over litigation.”97 A non-compliant attorney will
rarely qualify as a high profile commercial defendant, making Title III
complaints against them of little interest to the DOJ. Furthermore, the
focus on settlements and consent decrees means businesses have very
little public law to rely on when creating accessibility policies.98
Only a few settlement agreements between the DOJ and attorneys
who discriminated against their deaf or hard of hearing clients are
publicly available.99 However, anecdotal reports from deaf rights
advocates indicate that the problem is widespread. Karen Aguilar,
Associate Director of the Midwest Center for Law and the Deaf, reports
significant difficulty when trying to match deaf and hard of hearing
individuals with ADA-compliant lawyers.100 When Howard Rosenblum,
a deaf attorney in Chicago, passed the bar in 1992 he was immediately
flooded with calls from deaf and hard of hearing individuals throughout
Illinois.101 He often had to explain that he was too far away or that he
Ruth Colker, ADA Title III: A Fragile Compromise, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 377,
404–05 (2000) [hereinafter Colker, ADA Title III].
95
NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 12, at 11.
96
Id. at 167–68 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(1)(B) (2006)) (internal quotations omitted).
97
Id. at 168.
98
Waterstone, Untold Story, supra note 7, at 1874.
99
E.g., Settlement Agreement By the United States of America, Clifford B. Hearn, Jr., and
Clifford
B.
Hearn,
Jr.,
P.A.,
Dep’t
of
Just.
No.
202-15-37
(2008),
http://www.ada.gov/hearn.htm; Settlement Agreement Between the United States of
America and Joseph David Camacho, Esq., Albuquerque, New Mexico Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, Dep’t of Just. No. 202-4937 (2007),
http://www.ada.gov/albuquerue.htm [hereinafter Camacho Settlement Agreement];
Settlement Agreement Between the United States of America and Gregg Tirone, Esq., Dep’t
of Justice No. 202-53-20 (2004), http://www.ada.gov/tirone.htm [hereinafter Tirone
Settlement Agreement].
100
Telephone Interview with Karen Aguilar, Assoc. Dir., Midwest Ctr. for Law & the
Deaf (Oct. 1, 2009) [hereinafter Aguilar Interview].
101
E-mail from Howard Rosenblum, Founder & Chair, Midwest Ctr. on L. & the Deaf, to
author (Sept. 30, 2009, 12:33 CST) (on file with author).
94
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did not specialize in the area of law in which the caller needed
assistance. The influx of interested potential clients demonstrated to
Rosenblum the difficulties that the deaf and hard of hearing community
experience when attempting to obtain legal representation.102 The
following two cases illustrate how inaccessible the legal world is to the
deaf and hard of hearing community.
Kathleen Culhane Rozanski, a deaf woman in Rochester, NY, needed
to hire an attorney to handle her divorce. Ms. Rozanski communicates
with sign language and also lipreads.103 She retained attorney Gregg
Tirone.104 Her divorce involved a number of sensitive matters, including
domestic violence, child custody, and issues involving a restraining
order. According to Ms. Rozanski, “Mr. Tirone failed to provide a
qualified sign language interpreter during several meetings.”105 Mr.
Tirone instead chose to communicate with Ms. Rozanski using “pen and
paper, fax, lipreading, and by use of the National Relay Service when
communicating by phone.”106 At times Ms. Rozanski’s sister, who also
has some hearing loss, helped interpret during meetings with Mr.
Tirone.107
Ms. Rozanski filed a complaint with the DOJ alleging that Mr.
Tirone’s failure to provide a qualified sign language interpreter violated
Title III.108 Ms. Rozanski claimed that she did not always understand
She also claimed that the methods he used for
Mr. Tirone.109
communicating resulted in higher charges to her because “use of these
alternatives took longer than would have occurred had a qualified sign
language interpreter been used.”110 Mr. Tirone responded to Ms.
Rozanski’s allegations, claiming that he “represented Ms. Rozanski
adequately and professionally, and that he effectively communicated
with her.”111 He also believed that Ms. Rozanski always understood
him.112

Id.
Tirone Settlement Agreement, supra note 99, ¶ 4.
104
Id. ¶ 5.
105
Id. ¶ 6.
106
Id. ¶ 8.
107
Elizabeth Stull, Hearing the Legal Needs of the Deaf in New York, DAILY RECORD
(Rochester, NY), Feb. 6, 2009, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4180/
is_20090206/ai_n31322102/.
108
Tirone Settlement Agreement, supra 99, ¶¶ 3, 9.
109
Id. ¶ 8.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
102
103
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The DOJ investigated Ms. Rozanski’s complaint and concluded that
her allegations were meritorious.113 In light of this finding, Mr. Tirone
entered into a settlement agreement with the United States
Government.114 Under the terms of the Agreement, Mr. Tirone agreed to
pay Ms. Rozanski $2,200 and to forfeit any money she still owed him.115
Mr. Tirone acknowledged a single ADA violation and agreed to comply
with the terms set forth in the settlement agreement with the United
States.116 The DOJ’s findings included a determination that it was
inappropriate to use a family member as a sign language interpreter
when the matter involved domestic violence.117 The Agreement’s
findings went on to state that Ms. Rozanski’s sister was not qualified to
interpret because she “had no specialized training in interpreting legal
terms.”118 Despite the DOJ’s findings, Mr. Tirone continues to feel “like
[he] zealously represented [his] client within the bounds of the law and
procured a favorable result for her.”119
Ms. Rozanksi’s experience does not stand alone. In April, 2002,
Carolyn Tanaka’s six-year-old son was admitted to the University of
New Mexico Hospital for three days.120 Ms. Tanaka is also deaf and uses
American Sign Language to communicate. She alleged that the hospital,
on numerous occasions, did not provide a qualified sign language
interpreter as required by law.121 Ms. Tanaka retained lawyer Joseph
Camacho of Albuquerque in order to pursue her legal claim against the
hospital.122
Ms. Tanaka repeatedly asked Mr. Camacho to provide a qualified
interpreter for their meetings. But like the hospital, Ms. Tanaka’s lawyer
failed to provide the auxiliary aid or service necessary to communicate
with his client, as required by law.123 Mr. Camacho instead expected
Ms. Tanaka’s then nine-year-old son to “interpret” their meetings.124
Ultimately, Mr. Camacho withdrew from Ms. Tanaka’s case.125

Id. ¶ 20.
Id. ¶ 1.
115
Id. ¶ 22.
116
Id. ¶¶ 21–30.
117
Id. ¶ 19.
118
Id.
119
Stull, supra note 107 (quoting Mr. Tirone).
120
Camacho Settlement Agreement, supra note 99, ¶ 3.
121
Id.; see also Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (2006)
(defining public accommodation to include hospitals under Title III).
122
Camacho Settlement Agreement, supra note 99, ¶ 3.
123
42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F).
124
Camacho Settlement Agreement, supra note 99, ¶ 3.
125
Id.
113
114
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Ms. Tanaka contacted the National Association of the Deaf (“NAD”)
about her problems with Mr. Camacho. The NAD filed a complaint with
the DOJ, “alleging that Mr. Camacho refused to secure a qualified sign
language interpreter when necessary to ensure effective communication
with her.”126 The complaint against Mr. Camacho included evidence of
his Title III violation in the form of a letter from Mr. Camacho to Ms.
Tanaka.127 The letter included the following statement:
It is my understanding that you refuse to cooperate
unless I provide you with an interpreter, which will cost
me approximately eighty dollars an hour. I have never
had to pay to converse with my own client. It would be
different if you did not have anyone to translate for you.
However, you have a very intelligent son who can do it
for you. It appears that we are not able to work
together. I believe that you should find another attorney
as I am going to withdraw from this case.128
Mr. Camacho’s withdrawal left Ms. Tanaka without representation in
her suit against the hospital, resulting in the dismissal of her claim “due
to her failure to respond to discovery.”129 Mr. Camacho responded to
Ms. Tanaka’s allegations by maintaining “that he was able to
communicate effectively with [her] by means of written notes, e-mail,
telephone relays and through the interpretation of [her] nine-year-old
son.”130 Mr. Camacho also submitted a list of pleadings he prepared on
Ms. Tanaka’s behalf as evidence that he communicated effectively with
her.131
The DOJ did not find Mr. Camacho’s response compelling. After an
investigation, the DOJ concluded that the allegation that Mr. Camacho
failed to provide Ms. Tanaka with effective communication had merit.132
Mr. Camacho subsequently entered into a settlement agreement with the
United States government (“Camacho settlement agreement”).133 As part
of the agreement, Mr. Camacho agreed to pay Ms. Tanaka $1,000.134

126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
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Id. ¶ 8.
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The Camacho settlement agreement is a perfect example of why the
threat of DOJ action carries very little weight. Generally, alleged
discrimination by an attorney against a deaf or hard of hearing person
might be difficult to prove because an attorney can refuse a client by
simply saying they are too busy. The Camacho case, however, can easily
be categorized as a slam-dunk. Mr. Camacho would be hard-pressed to
argue that he was unaware of his obligations under Title III because he
was pursuing a Title III claim on behalf of his client, Ms. Tanaka.135
Despite his assumed familiarity with Title III’s requirements, Mr.
Camacho still thought it appropriate to request that Ms. Tanaka’s nineyear-old son interpret their attorney-client meetings.136 Mr. Camacho
seemed unconcerned with the fact that as a child, Ms Tanaka’s son was
almost assuredly not familiar with the necessary legal terminology in
order to adequately interpret his advice, never mind the fact that it was
the child’s hospital stay at issue in Ms. Tanaka’s suit.137 Under these
circumstances, Ms. Tanaka’s son was arguably the last person Mr.
Camacho could claim as being both “qualified” and “impartial.”138
Although the DOJ found Ms. Tanaka’s allegations against Mr.
Camacho “meritorious,” they offered Mr. Camacho an easy way out—
pay $1,000 and agree to abide by the ADA and no further litigation
would result.139 The settlement agreement even stated that Mr.
Camacho’s reason for accepting the agreement was to “resolve [the]
matter without further litigation” and, in exchange, the DOJ agreed not
to investigate Mr. Camacho further.140 Mr. Camacho’s punishment
under the settlement agreement, however, does little to “compensate the
deaf individual for the discrimination that she has suffered.”141
Furthermore, the $1,000 award is not likely to leave other attorneys in
fear of possible Title III enforcement.
The DOJ saw the Camacho settlement agreement as a major victory.
In fact, Assistant Attorney General Wan J. Kim praised Mr. Camacho for
“working with [the Justice Department] and recognizing the importance

Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id.; see also DOJ TITLE III MANUAL, supra note 56, III-4.3200 (explaining that when an
interpreter is required, the public accommodation must provide a qualified interpreter who
conveys communication impartially).
139
Camacho Settlement Agreement, supra note 99, at ¶¶ 10–16.
140
Id. ¶ 11.
141
Telephone Interview with Marc Charmatz, Senior Attorney, Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf
(Nov. 9, 2009) [hereinafter Charmatz Interview]. Mr. Charmatz worked with Tanaka on
her claim by the DOJ against Camacho.
135
136
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of clear communication with clients.”142 The statements made by Mr.
Camacho and included in the settlement agreement, however, hardly
suggest an attorney who has recognized the importance of clear
communication. Kim went on to say that the DOJ hoped “that this
agreement [would] be a model for other attorneys and law firms.”143
The DOJ’s decision to settle for miniscule monetary damages and a
good faith promise sends a clear message to attorneys—even if they
violate Title III’s accommodation mandate, they are not likely to face
litigation or stiff fines. The DOJ’s current enforcement regime provides
no incentives for an attorney to pay for an auxiliary aid or service for
their deaf or hard of hearing client. Non-compliant behavior is rarely, if
ever, going to result in a DOJ initiated action, let alone a financial award
for the plaintiff that must be paid by the non-compliant attorney.
Aggressive enforcement of Title III is necessary in order to achieve
widespread compliance by lawyers.144 The DOJ’s inaction merely
reinforces the status quo—lack of compliance and unremedied
violations.
C. Why Title III Is Failing
Title III is unique, both within the ADA and when compared to the
CRA, upon which much of it is fashioned. Title III is the only ADA
provision that does not provide a damage remedy for private litigants.
Instead, those suing under Title III are entitled only to prospective relief,
in the form of an injunction.145 Congress lifted the remedies available
under Title III directly from the CRA.146 Just as Senator Kennedy feared,
however, the differences between the CRA’s anti-discrimination
mandate and Title III’s accommodation mandate make the CRA’s
remedies ineffective for many potential Title III litigants.147
Unlike the CRA, Title III requires that public accommodations take
proactive steps to ensure equal access for people with disabilities.
Entities covered by Title III must do more than simply allow access to a
disabled person. Public accommodations must make “reasonable
modifications” or provide “auxiliary aids and services” to ensure that
142
Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Albuquerque, N.M. Law Office Agrees to Provide Effective
Communication to Deaf and Hard of Hearing Clients (Aug. 9, 2007), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/August/07_crt_598.html.
143
Id.
144
Bagenstos, supra note 81, at 9 (“[W]idespread compliance with the ADA’s accessibility
requirements is unlikely in the absence of a realistic threat of vigorous enforcement of those
requirements.”).
145
42 U.S.C. § 12188(a) (2006) (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (2006)).
146
Id.
147
See 135 CONG. REC. 19,888 (1989).
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“no individual with a disability is . . . denied services.”148 Compliance
with Title III often results in an expense to the covered entity, whereas
CRA compliance can usually be achieved with a simple practice or policy
change, such as the removal of a “whites only” sign.149 Title III and the
CRA also differ in their definition of public accommodation. It has been
said that “the breadth of Title III’s coverage was purchased at the cost of
the strength of its remedies.”150 Title III expanded the definition of
public accommodation from three categories to twelve. The trade-off,
however, was that the compensatory damages remedy for private
actions was removed from Title III.151 The discussion below illustrates
why Title III’s limited remedies increase the number of hurdles a
potential Title III plaintiff must overcome.
1.

Barriers to Private Actions Under Title III

Deaf and hard of hearing plaintiffs who attempt to pursue private
causes of action under Title III face a number of justiciability barriers. 152
Standing is one such barrier.153 In order to be justiciable, a plaintiff’s
claim must satisfy the Constitution’s case or controversy requirement.154
The Court has explained that in order to satisfy this requirement “a
plaintiff must, generally speaking, demonstrate that he has suffered
‘injury in fact,’ that the injury is ‘fairly traceable’ to the actions of the
defendant, and that the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable
decision.”155 Therefore, because the relief available to a Title III plaintiff
is prospective, he must do more than simply show he was the victim of
discriminatory treatment.156 Instead, he “must meet the continuing
violation doctrine . . . [by] show[ing] that there is a risk of the harm
happening to him again [in the future].”157
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)–(iii).
COLKER, DISABILITY PENDULUM, supra note 17, at 184.
150
BLANCK, supra note 15, § 17.1.
151
See supra text accompanying notes 15–35 (outlining the legislative history of Title III of
the ADA).
152
See Alex Reinert, Procedural Barriers to Civil Rights Litigation and the Illusory Promise of
Equity, 78 UMKC L. REV. 931, 943–44 (2010).
153
Id. at 943; see also infra text accompanying notes 154–65 (explaining the development of
standing doctrine pertinent to Title III analysis).
154
U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2; see also David Rudovsky, Lecture, Running in Place: The
Paradox of Expanding Rights and Restricted Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1236 n.225
(2005) (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 213–14
(2000); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997)).
155
Spear, 520 U.S. at 162.
156
Waterstone, Untold Story, supra note 7, at 1871.
157
Id.; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (“A federal court’s jurisdiction
therefore can be invoked only when the plaintiff himself has suffered ‘some threatened or
148
149
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Lack of standing often prevents Title III plaintiffs from bringing
successful claims.158 Standing became even harder for Title III plaintiffs
to claim after the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons.159 Lyons raised the bar beyond the “personal stake” requirement,
“impos[ing] a stricter test, demanding a strong likelihood of recurrence
of unconstitutional conduct.”160 Lyons involved a civil rights action
against the City of Los Angeles. The plaintiff alleged that, during the
course of a traffic stop, he was illegally choked by a police officer.161 The
Court, quoting O’Shea v. Littleton,162 said that “[p]ast exposure to illegal
conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding
injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse
effects.”163 The Court held that even if the plaintiff was illegally choked,
he did not have standing to sue because he could not “establish a real
and immediate threat that he would again be stopped for a traffic
violation, or for any other offense, by an officer or officers who would
illegally choke him into unconsciousness without any provocation or
resistance on his part.”164
Under the Lyons “real and immediate threat” test, a person who is
denied a Title III-mandated accommodation must show that they plan to
return to the same public accommodation again in the future.165 Given
this paradigm, if a lawyer fails to comply with Title III, their disabled
client can only bring a Title III claim if the client demonstrates that the
non-compliant lawyer will continue to represent them. One can imagine
the worst-case scenario—a deaf person, in order to enforce her rights,
must sue her own attorney while expecting the attorney to
simultaneously advocate on her behalf.
Mootness also presents a barrier for Title III litigants. A case is
mooted when the complained of conduct has ceased.166 If a noncompliant lawyer then complies with Title III at any point prior to trial,
actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action . . . .’” (quoting Linda R. S. v.
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973))).
158
Elizabeth Keadle Markey, The ADA’s Last Stand?: Standing and the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 185, 186 (2002).
159
461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983).
160
Rudovsky, supra note 154, at 1236.
161
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 97–98.
162
414 U.S. 488 (1974).
163
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting O’Shea, 414
U.S. at 495–96).
164
Id. at 105.
165
Id.
166
See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969) (“Simply stated, a case is moot
when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable
interest in the outcome.”).
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the case against him is mooted because the complained-of-conduct has
ceased. The defendant in a Title III case has total control over whether
the litigation continues and, in light of the Court’s 2001 decision in
Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health
and Human Resources, they do not even face the risk of an attorney’s fee
award prior to completion of litigation.167
There is an exception available under the capable-of-repetition
doctrine for claims found to be moot or that otherwise lack standing.168
The doctrine applies when the following two prong test has been
satisfied: (1) the allegedly illegal action does not last long enough to
allow for litigation to complete before it ceases; and (2) the complainant
is reasonably likely to be subject to the complained of action again.169
The Court has declined to extend this doctrine to civil rights cases
involving requests for injunctive relief.170 This is unsurprising in light of
the Lyons Court’s statement that “the capable-of-repetition doctrine
applies only in exceptional situations, and generally only where the
named plaintiff can make a reasonable showing that he will again be
subjected to the alleged illegality.”171 The Court’s stringent view of the
doctrine precludes its use by most Title III ADA plaintiffs.172
A Title III plaintiff attempting to invoke the capable-of-repetition
doctrine to sue her former attorney will rarely, if ever, be able to satisfy
the doctrine’s two prongs. The first prong—that the allegedly illegal
action does not last long enough to allow for litigation to complete before
it ceases—seems achievable. Once the deaf or hard of hearing person
finds that an attorney is inaccessible, the need to obtain new counsel
immediately necessarily limits the “challenged action” to a brief period
of time.173 The second prong—the complainant is reasonably likely to be
subject to the complained of action again—is far more problematic. A
deaf or hard of hearing person, once denied auxiliary aids or services by
an attorney, is not likely to try and secure legal services from the same
attorney in the future. It is irrelevant that another deaf or hard of
hearing person might seek the inaccessible attorney’s services and face

532 U.S. 598, 60910 (2001).
See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462 (2007)
(discussing “the established exception to mootness for disputes capable of repetition, yet
evading review”).
169
Id. (citing Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998)).
170
COLKER, DISABILITY PENDULUM, supra note 17, at 185.
171
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983).
172
COLKER, DISABILITY PENDULUM, supra note 17, at 185.
173
Id.; see also Markey, supra note 158 (stating that theoretically the challenged action
would be seen as ending at the same point a court would otherwise find the complaint to
be moot—when a potential plaintiff has secured counsel from another attorney).
167
168

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 3 [2011], Art. 8

1166 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

similar discriminatory treatment. The potential plaintiff in question
would almost assuredly fail to satisfy the capable-of-repetition doctrine’s
second prong.
Howard Rosenblum, the Founder and Chair of the Midwest Center
on Law and the Deaf, believes that many deaf and hard of hearing
people do not have standing to sue the inaccessible lawyers they
encounter because they obtain new counsel. According to Rosenblum,
these types of situations have probably “happened countless times but
we will never know because [the] deaf [or hard of hearing] people were
enjoined from suing.”174 In light of this, private actions against attorneys
for failure to comply with Title III rarely, if ever, occur.175 Consequently,
absent an expansion of the capable-of-review doctrine for Title III claims,
injunctive relief is likely to remain a weak and largely ineffective
remedy.
2.

The Dismantling of the Attorney’s Fee Award Provision

Congress intended for citizens to have “a meaningful opportunity to
vindicate the important Congressional policies which [civil rights] laws
contain.”176 Most Title III plaintiffs are represented by solo practitioners
who depend on the award of attorney’s fees.177 Because the recovery of
attorney’s fees is often a private attorney’s only incentive to take on a
Title III case, any limit on attorney fee recovery is devastating for future
private action enforcement. Traditionally attorney’s fees have been
recoverable in private ADA actions brought under Titles I, II, or III.
Because compensatory damages are not available under Title III,
“statutory attorneys’ fees are likely to be the exclusive source of
compensation for [plaintiffs’] lawyers.”178 Congress has expressly
recognized the difficulty faced by attorneys who pursue litigation under
civil rights statutes. The Senate Report on The Civil Rights Attorney’s
Fees Awards Act of 1976,179 stated that
174
E-mail from Howard Rosenblum, Founder & Chair, Midwest Ctr. on L. & the Deaf, to
author (Jan. 4, 2010, 00:31 CST) (on file with author).
175
A Westlaw search for state and federal cases under Title III of the ADA resulted in no
cases against an attorney by a deaf or hard of hearing client. Waterstone, Untold Story,
supra note 7, at 1853 (citing research by Colker). In fact, there were only 82 Title III
appellate cases through 2004, as compared to 197 Title II appellate cases and, through 2001,
720 Title I cases. Id.
176
S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5910.
177
NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 12, at 168.
177
Id.
178
Bagenstos, supra note 81, at 10.
179
Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641
(1976).
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[i]f successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear
their own attorneys’ fees, few aggrieved parties would
be in a position to advance the public interest by
invoking the injunctive powers of the Federal courts.
Congress therefore enacted the provision for counsel
fees . . . to encourage individuals . . . to seek judicial
relief.180
The Senate Report referred to what it called “fee shifting provisions”
under which a court can order a defendant to pay the attorney’s fees of a
successful plaintiff.
Fee shifting provisions are integral to the
enforcement of civil rights legislation.181
In 2001, Buckhannon effectively gutted the ADA’s attorney’s fee
award provision, further hampering the efforts of Title III plaintiffs.182 In
Buckhannon, a corporation that operated the Buckhannon Board and Care
Home filed suit against West Virginia claiming that a state statutory
requirement violated the FHA and the ADA.183 The state legislature
responded by eliminating the statute and the case was subsequently
dismissed as moot.184 Buckhannon claimed that attorney’s fees should
be awarded under a “catalyst theory,” which the Court understood as
“posit[ing] that a plaintiff is a ‘prevailing party’ if it achieves the desired
result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the
defendant’s conduct.”185
Rejecting Buckhannon’s claim, the Court held that in order for
attorney’s fees to be awarded in an ADA case, “a party [must] secure
either a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree.”186
As a result, if a defendant changes their practices and becomes ADAcompliant on the eve of a trial, the opposing party’s counsel will be
barred from any potential fee recovery.187
Buckhannon’s impact is twofold. First, it is difficult to see why any
attorney would view a Title III client as attractive when the statute
eliminates the possibility of a monetary award and voluntary compliance
by the defendant can foreclose recovery of attorney’s fees. Second,

180
S. REP. 94-1011, at 3 (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402
(1968)).
181
Id. at 4.
182
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S.
598, 609–10 (2001).
183
Id. at 600–01.
184
Id. at 601.
185
Id.
186
COLKER, DISABILITY PENDULUM, supra note 17, at 170.
187
Id. at 171.
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Buckhannon effectively encourages public accommodations, including
attorneys, to remain non-compliant with Title III.188 A lawyer can wait
for a claim to be filed and then, at any given point prior to a judicial
ruling, become compliant. Litigation costs are the lawyer’s only
incentive to comply with Title III sooner rather than later. The lawyer,
therefore, can avoid any additional cost above and beyond the cost of
compliance while society, in turn, will see a decrease in voluntary
compliance because lawyers now have little incentive to comply before
For the ADA and civil rights statutes,
litigation is initiated.189
Buckhannon left “the infrastructure still standing but kill[ed] the heart of
[the] statutes.”190
Buckhannon is also inconsistent with Congress’s stated desire to see
the “broadest and most effective remedies” provided for civil rights-type
legislation.191 The drafters of the ADA recognized the importance of a
fee shifting paradigm in facilitating meaningful civil rights litigation—a
paradigm even more crucial when the relevant legislation does not allow
for recovery of monetary damages. As a result, section 12205 of the ADA
states that a court or agency “may allow the prevailing party . . . a
reasonable attorney’s fee.”192 After Buckhannon, few attorneys can afford to
take on Title III cases because of the significant risk that no attorney’s fee
will be awarded.193
D. Awareness
Most lawyers are likely unaware that they must comply with the
ADA and by extension, most lawyers likely believe that they can pass
along the cost of a sign language interpreter to their clients. While a
study proving these assumptions is beyond the scope of this Article,
there is plenty of reason to believe that they are true. The Maine Bar
Journal similarly asserted “[i]t is likely that few attorneys have
considered the fact that law offices are covered entities under the
Americans with Disabilities Act.”194 Attorneys generally expect to pass
client-specific costs on to the client. In California, for example, absent a
written agreement, “court costs and direct client costs are recoverable
Bagenstos, supra note 81, at 12.
Id.
190
Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil Rights: The
Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1087, 1131
(2007).
191
S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 3 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5910.
192
42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2006) (emphasis added).
193
NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 12 at 168–69.
194
Beth Gallie & Deirdre M. Smith, Representing Deaf Clients: What Every Lawyer Should
Know, 15 ME. B.J. 128, 128 (2000).
188
189
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from [the] client.”195 Here, “court costs” can include things such as
“travel expense, per diem, copying, facsimile, telephone, messenger,
mailing, excess secretarial services, paralegal services, investigators,
process servers, expert fees, [and] medical records.”196 The Comments to
Rule 1.5 of the American Bar Association’s (“ABA’s”) Model Rules of
Professional Conduct also state that “[a] lawyer may seek
reimbursement for the cost of services performed in-house, such as
copying, or for other expenses incurred in-house, such as telephone
charges.”197 Given this paradigm, it is easy to see why absorbing the cost
of a client-specific auxiliary aid or service is largely counterintuitive for
most legal professionals. Attorneys are likely to view the cost of
auxiliary aids and services just as Rochester Attorney Gregg Tirone did,
as cutting into the price of doing business.198 If attorneys do not know
about Title III’s mandate, they will continue passing along the cost of
auxiliary aids and services to their clients so as not to cut into their
profits.
The Tirone and Camacho cases are classic examples of attorneys’ lack
of awareness of their obligations under Title III.199 Moreover, even if
attorneys have considered their responsibilities under the ADA, they
may mistakenly believe that they are not covered if they have fifteen or
fewer employees because of what they know to be true in the context of
Title I employment accommodations.200 The moment a deaf or hard of
hearing person walks into a lawyer’s office, the lawyer must be prepared
to accommodate her needs—even if that means scheduling another time
to meet so an auxiliary aid or service can be secured.201
Lack of awareness extends beyond awareness of Title III’s
requirements. Many businesses are unaware of the “extent to which
disability is pervasive in the communities that businesses and other
entities serve.”202 In order to comply with Title III, for example, a lawyer
Lindsay Kohut Slatter, How to Defy Fate By Fee Agreement, 537 LITIG. & ADMIN. PRAC.
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES (PLI) 265, 271 (1995).
196
Id.
197
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5 cmt. (2010).
198
Stull, supra note 107.
199
See supra notes 104–19 and accompanying text (describing the Tirone case); supra notes
120–41 and accompanying text (describing the Camacho case).
200
See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2006) (defining the employer to include those with fifteen
or more employees, which exempts small employers from the prohibitions of Title I of the
ADA); see also Stull, supra note 107 (“Title III, however, specifically mentions law firms as
places of public accommodation. Both the ADA and New York State’s Human Rights Law
as well as attorney ethics codes state that law firms must provide clients with reasonable
accommodations, unless doing so creates an undue burden.”).
201
42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F).
202
NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 12, at 63.
195
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must not only understand her financial obligations under Title III—she
must also understand the unique needs of her disabled client. Not every
deaf and hard of hearing client requires the same type of auxiliary aid or
service. Attorneys also need to know that “[s]igning and interpreting are
not the same thing.”203 A lawyer must be flexible and work with the
client to determine what accommodation will best facilitate
communication between the lawyer and the client.
IV. THE THREE-E APPROACH TO REVIVING TITLE III
If Title III is going to achieve its ultimate purpose, individualized
attention must be given to the different types of public accommodations
covered by the Act. The multitude of disabilities covered by the ADA
must also be considered. A change that may benefit the deaf and hard of
hearing community may inadvertently, and perhaps unexpectedly, be
problematic for a different disabled community. Although addressing
the various solutions needed to satisfy everyone at the ADA table is
beyond the scope of this Article, the following proposal shows what can
be done to serve one population in need of one type of service. It is
intended that this will serve as the beginning of a continued dialogue
about the specific needs of different populations and how those needs
manifest themselves in different types of settings.
As shown in Part III, the challenges facing deaf and hard of hearing
individuals attempting to find an accessible attorney are multifaceted. A
multifaceted problem demands a multifaceted solution that attacks the
problem from various angles. This Part argues that the problems
identified in Part III can be addressed using the “Three-E Approach.”
This approach focuses on three distinct areas—education, economics,
and enforcement—all of which need attention if Title III is to be of use to
the deaf and hard of hearing seeking legal assistance. First, lawyers
must know their obligations to deaf and hard of hearing clients. Second,
there must be financial resources available to pay for the auxiliary aid or
service required. Third, both Congress and the Court must take action to
change Title III’s current enforcement and remedial scheme. Progress
must be made on all of these fronts if Title III is to be the tool Congress
intended.
A. Educating the Legal Community
Lawyers must know of their obligations under the ADA in order to
be compliant; therefore, education is key to obtaining increased Title III
203
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compliance by the legal profession.
As a largely self-regulated
industry,204 the legal profession must take responsibility for ensuring
that its members are ADA-compliant. Generally speaking, state bar
associations control who can practice law.205 State bars also establish
local rules and regulations for the practice of law as well as licensing
standards. Ethical rules are also promulgated by state bar associations.
Most states model their ethical rules on the ABA’s Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (“MRPC”).206
Theoretically, the MRPC already contains a provision requiring
lawyers to provide communication access.207 The MRPC also requires
that lawyers abide by the law, thereby reinforcing a lawyer’s ethical
obligation to be Title III compliant.208 In reality, however, until the ABA
and state bar associations make ADA compliance a priority, the current
MPRC provisions are no more effective than Title III itself. As “the
national representative of the legal profession,” the ABA is best
positioned to ensure that American lawyers are satisfying their duties
under both Title III and the MRPC.209 If the ABA implements the
following changes, “[w]idespread [n]oncompliance with Title III”210
within the legal profession likely will become a thing of the past. First,
the ABA should amend the MRPC to include a Comment explicitly
acknowledging a lawyer’s communication access obligations under Title
III.
Second, state Continuing Legal Education (“CLE”) course
requirements should include a mandatory class on the ADA and
lawyers’ responsibilities under Title III.
Although each state has its own set of rules for professional conduct
for lawyers, all but California have adopted the MRPC put forth by the
ABA.211 The ABA also publishes Comments to the MRPC. All but eight
states have adopted these Comments.212 Rule 1.4 of the MRPC regulates
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmb. (2010).
See generally NAT’L CONFERENCE OF B. EXAM’RS, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR
ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 2010 (Erica Moeser & Claire Huismann eds., 2010) (setting out
the rules and practices of all U.S. jurisdictions for admission to the bar by examination and
on motion).
206
About the Model Rules, ABA, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/model_rules.html
(last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
207
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4.
208
Id. at R. 8.4.
209
About the American Bar Association, ABA, http://www.abanet.org/about/?gnav=
global_about_lead (last visited Nov. 2, 2010).
210
NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 12, at 179.
211
See generally Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
Dates of Adoption, ABA,
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/alpha_states.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2011) (listing
states that have adopted the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
212
Only Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, and South
Dakota have not adopted the Model Rules. Id.
204
205
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communication within the client-lawyer relationship. According to the
rule, a lawyer must, among other things, “reasonably consult with the
client about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be
accomplished; . . . keep the client reasonably informed about the status of
the matter; . . . [and] promptly comply with reasonable requests for
information.”213 In addition, “[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the
extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation.”214
The first Comment to Rule 1.4 states that “[r]easonable
communication between the lawyer and the client is necessary for the
client effectively to participate in the representation.”215 The obligations
an attorney has under Rule 1.4 align with Title III’s requirement that the
attorney ensure effective communication with their deaf or hard of
hearing client. Although some might think that Rule 1.4’s language is
sufficient to make a Title III violation by a lawyer an ethical violation as
well, this is not always seen as the case. For instance, Marc Charmatz,
Senior Attorney for the NAD, reported Mr. Camacho’s failure to
effectively communicate with Ms. Tanaka to the Disciplinary Board of
New Mexico.216 The New Mexico Rule of Professional Conduct
regulating attorney-client communication is substantially similar to the
MRPC’s Rule 1.4.217 The Disciplinary Board, however, did not view
Mr. Camacho’s Title III violation as being appropriate for disciplinary
action, instead claiming that Ms. Tanaka had a “discrimination claim.” 218
Bar associations play a central role in regulating lawyers and
therefore are equally responsible for pursuing Title III violations, which
would also seemingly result in a Rule 1.4 violation. Despite violating
both Title III of the ADA and Rule 1.4, however, lawyers like Mr.
Camacho are often only punished for Title III violations. In Mr.
Camacho’s case, the Disciplinary Board of New Mexico’s refusal to
pursue the grievance against him ran counter to the Board’s stated
purpose—“look[ing] into complaints about attorneys licensed to practice
law in New Mexico to determine whether the attorneys have violated the
Rules of Professional Conduct.”219 The Association of the Bar of the City
of New York serves as an excellent example of how bar associations
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(2)–(4).
Id. at R. 1.4(b).
215
Id. at R. 1.4 cmt.
216
Charmatz Interview, supra note 141.
217
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4; N.M. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 16-104
(2009).
218
Charmatz Interview, supra note 141.
219
THE DISCIPLINARY BD. OF THE N.M. SUP. CT., http://www.nmdisboard.org/index.htm
(last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
213
214
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should handle the duality of an attorney’s Title III violation.220 In Formal
Opinion 1995-12, the Association concluded that, under the New York
Lawyer’s Code of Professional Responsibility, “[a] lawyer who
undertakes to represent a client with whom effective direct lawyer-client
communication can only be maintained through an interpreter must
consider the need for interpreter services and when necessary take steps
to secure the services of a qualified interpreter.”221
The ABA has also recognized attorneys’ obligations to their deaf or
hard of hearing client, stating that “[t]he most immediate concern for the
lawyer is whether the client with a hearing impairment needs or requests
an
accommodation. . . . [L]awyers
should
ask
clients
what
accommodations they need to communicate best.”222 The ABA further
noted that an ethical violation occurs when a lawyer avoids an attorneyclient relationship with a person requiring an auxiliary aid or service.223
It is hardly far-fetched to expect state disciplinary boards to pursue Title
III violations as ethical violations given the ABA’s acknowledgement
that lawyers have both Title III and professional ethical obligations to
deaf and hard of hearing clients.224
In order to ensure that state legal ethics boards do not forgo
pursuing ethical violations simply because conduct is also illegal, the
ABA should amend the Comments to Rule 1.4 to include the following
provision:
An attorney who has a deaf or hard of hearing client
must provide and pay for auxiliary aids and services, or
an effective alternative as defined by Title III of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, for in-person attorneyclient meetings. Failure to comply with Title III of the

220
Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York, Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Formal
Op. 1995-12 (1995), available at http://www.abcny.org/Ethics/eth1995-12.htm.
221
Id.
222
JOHN PARRY, DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION LAW, EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY: A
COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE MANUAL FOR LAWYERS, JUDGES AND DISABILITY PROFESSIONALS
119 (2008). This reference manual was published by the ABA and is available on the ABA’s
Commission
on
Mental
and
Physical
Disability
Law’s
webpage
at
http://www.abanet.org/disability/docs/client-lawyer.doc.
223
Id. at 124. Parry states the following:
Regrettably, the tendency of some lawyers . . . to avoid such
relationships [requiring auxiliary aids or services] in the first place or
not actively solicit them . . . harms society, violates basic ethical standards
of conduct for lawyers not to discriminate, is short-sighted in terms of
building a clientele, and . . . may violate federal and state laws.
Id. (emphasis added).
224
See id. at 119.
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Americans with Disabilities Act in representing a deaf or
hard of hearing client is a violation of Rule 1.4.225
With the addition of this Comment, state disciplinary boards could
not claim that an attorney’s violation of Title III is outside of their
purview. Although an attorney may assert a Title III undue burden
defense, a disciplinary board’s ultimate determination should not focus
on whether a Title III violation occurred but rather whether the lawyer
satisfied her ethical obligations. Because the text of Rule 1.4 would not
change, a lawyer must still “reasonably consult with the client about the
means by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished.”226 A
failure to reasonably consult with a client, regardless of the reason,
remains a violation of Rule 1.4. Undue burden is not an available
defense to ethical rule violations. Once an allegation has been made, it is
up to a disciplinary board to decide whether an undue burden defense
can be appropriately considered.
This Comment needs to be
implemented alongside the creation of Communication Access Funds,
discussed subsequently, so that all attorneys, regardless of their
individual financial situation, have the resources to afford auxiliary aids
or services as necessary.
The Comment will provide discrimination victims an additional
avenue by which to achieve redress. The more options victims have for
recourse, the greater the threat of enforcement. The potential for
increased enforcement will incentivize attorneys to be proactive in their
obligations under Title III, rather than reactive. Ideally, when an
attorney has a potential deaf or hard of hearing client, he or she would
immediately begin a discussion of what auxiliary aid or service is
necessary for the potential client. The adoption of this Comment will
serve to draw more attention to obligations that are often overlooked.
The adoption of this Comment will also allow for testing on Title
III’s requirements of recent law school graduates, who typically have to
pass bar and ethical examinations before practicing law.227 Although
each state bar examination is different, forty-seven states require that
students pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam (“MPRE”)
in order to practice. By incorporating Title III into the MRPC, soon-to-be
attorneys should have at least some knowledge of what Title III requires
before they begin to practice. This is only one small step towards

This provision is proposed by the author.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(2) (2010).
227
See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF B. EXAM’RS, supra note 205, at 2831 (outlining bar and
ethical examination requirements for all fifty states).
225
226
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educating the bar. It is not realistic to expect that the MPRE alone will
ensure complete Title III knowledge among new attorneys.
Lawyers in forty-two states are also required to take Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (“MCLE”) courses throughout their
career.228 All states that mandate MCLE completion require that some
portion of the courses taken be in ethics.229 In order to ensure that
current attorneys learn of their obligations under the ADA, state CLE
commissions or boards should require attorneys to take a CLE ethics
course in attorney compliance with the ADA within their first three years
of practice. While it will be difficult to implement this requirement
because it requires action on a state-by-state basis, this change should not
prove impossible. The structure and requirements for MCLEs are
already established—this proposed change simply asks states to require
one additional topic-specific ethics course for attorneys within their state.
B. Economics
In order to lower the cost of compliance for attorneys, state-based
Communication Access Funds (“CAFs”), as proposed by the NAD,
should be created to pay for costs of accommodation.230 Attacking the
Title III noncompliance problem from an economic perspective requires
a decrease in the cost of compliance. This is especially crucial because,
according to Professor Michele LaVigne, “most deaf people are using
small firm or solo practice attorneys for things like divorce, small claims,
etc.; [and thus] the potential lawyers don't have much money.”231
Depending on the nature and length of representation, the cost for a
certified interpreter can range widely as interpreters are usually billed on
a per-hour basis.232 While a lawyer or law firm could claim that Title III’s
See ABA Ctr. for Continuing Legal Educ., MCLE Frequently Asked Questions, ABA,
http://www.abanet.org/cle/mclefaq.html#over (last visited Oct. 19, 2010) (showing that
the range of hours required for ethics and professionalism classes varies by state, typically
ranging from one to three hours per year).
229
Id.
230
NAD Advocacy Statement, supra note 13.
231
E-mail from Michele LaVigne, Clinical Professor, Univ. of Wis. Law Sch., to author
(Sept. 24, 2009, 07:27 CST) (on file with author).
232
The cost of a sign language interpreter, which is typically charged per hour, varies
significantly from state to state. See, e.g., Contractors Providing Sign Language Interpreter
Services, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.dshs.wa.gov/hrsa/
odhh/interpcon.shtml (last visited Nov. 25, 2009) (Level V interpreters cost $55 per hour
with a one-hour minimum); Fee Schedule and Payment Policy, NEB. SUP. CT. INTERPRETER
(2010), http://www.supremecourt.ne.gov/rules/misc/interpreter-payment.pdf (certified
interpreters cost $50 per hour with a two-hour minimum); Mass. Comm’n for the Deaf &
Hard of Hearing, MCD01 Rates for FY’10 and FY’11, COMMONWEALTH OF MASS.: EXEC.
OFFICE OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.mass.gov/Eeohhs2/docs/mcdhh/
228
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requirements present an undue burden,233 the burden is measured
against the entire financial health of the firm and not the profitability of
the individual client.234 The Code of Federal Regulations identifies
numerous factors that are to be considered when determining whether
an accommodation is readily achievable, and thus does not constitute an
undue burden, including: the cost of the accommodation, the lawyer’s
overall financial resources, and the lawyer or law firm’s number of
employees.235
The NAD proposed the creation of CAFs in order to address the
cost-of-compliance problem.236 The NAD, in an advocacy statement
supporting the creation of CAFs, stated that “[p]eople who are deaf
continue to encounter significant communication barriers when
attempting to obtain private legal services and representation, despite
the mandate of the [ADA].”237 In response to this problem, the NAD’s
proposed solution would “ease the financial responsibility attorneys and
law firms bear in order to meet their obligations under the ADA to
ensure effective communication with people who are deaf.”238
Under the NAD’s proposal, CAFs would be created on a state-bystate level by state bar and/or licensing agencies.239 The CAFs would be
funded by nominal fees paid by all bar members in the given state.
These funds would then finance the provision of auxiliary aids and
services when a deaf or hard of hearing individual is receiving legal
representation.240 Funds similar to the CAFs already exist in three
states.241 In addition, Maine has a Legal Interpreting Fund that attorneys
are allowed to use for client meetings and depositions.242 The creation of
these funds would eliminate any potential “undue burden” claim by an
attorney, who might otherwise find the cost of securing auxiliary aids
and services overly burdensome.243

sign_language_interpreter_rates.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2009) (interpreters costs range
from $30–$67 per hour).
233
See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2009) (defining “[u]ndue burden” as “significant difficulty or
expense,” and outlining the factors to determine whether an undue burden exists or
whether accommodation is “readily achievable,” which is also defined in the regulation).
234
Id.
235
Id.
236
NAD Advocacy Statement, supra note 13.
237
Id. (footnote omitted).
238
Id.
239
Id.
240
Id.
241
See id. (indicating that New York, Colorado, and Pennsylvania already have funds
established).
242
Gallie & Smith, supra note 194, at 130.
243
Id.
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In addition to the creation of CAFs, the DOJ should publicize the tax
credits available to attorneys who do pay for auxiliary aids and services
under Title III. Under the Internal Revenue Code, a small business can
claim a tax credit for expenditures made to provide access to disabled
individuals.244 The tax credit “shall be an amount equal to 50 percent of
so much of the eligible access expenditures for the taxable year as exceed
$250 but do not exceed $10,250.”245 Although this law alone is unlikely
to increase compliance significantly, increased awareness of the tax
credit can only help improve the current state of compliance because the
tax credit is an equitable sharing of the costs of compliance.246
Attorneys must see compliance with Title III as the norm, rather than
as an extra step. Instead of thinking about the cost of an interpreter as a
client-generated cost, attorneys and firms should have a line item in their
annual budget for accessibility. Providing an auxiliary aid or service is
an overhead cost, similar to rent, utilities, and office supplies that cannot
be recovered from clients.247 Making one’s legal practice accessible by
providing an auxiliary aid or service to a deaf or hard of hearing client is
part of the cost of doing business and should be treated as such.
C. Increasing Title III Enforcement
Title III enforcement must be increased if widespread compliance by
attorneys is to be realized. Professor Waterstone accurately asserts that
“[l]itigation, or the threat of litigation, is a means to an end—narrowing
the gap between what laws formally state should happen and what
actually does happen.”248 This rationale follows the “deterrence model,”
which “suggests that people obey the law when the perceived costs and
probability of punishment outweigh the cost of compliance.”249 Without
the real threat of litigation, whether initiated by the DOJ or via private
action, attorneys have little incentive to comply with Title III because the
probability of punishment does not outweigh the price of compliance.250

244
26 U.S.C. § 44(b)(1)(a)–(b) (2006). A small business is defined as having less than
$1,000,000 of gross receipts in the previous taxable year; or having employed less than
thirty full-time employees during the previous taxable year. Id.
245
Id. § 44(a).
246
135 CONG. REC. 19,841 (1989).
247
See Molly Kilmer Flood, Cost Recovery: What’s Fair Game?, 15 PROF. LAW., no. 2, 2004 at
27, 27.
248
Waterstone, New Vision, supra note 81, at 479.
249
Jeb Barnes & Thomas F. Burke, The Diffusion of Rights: From Law on the Books to
Organizational Rights Practices, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 493, 495 (2006).
250
Id.
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Studies have also suggested that litigation achieves “greater accessibility
than a nonlitigious collaborative approach.”251
The ADA was designed to provide two avenues for enforcement of a
person’s rights under Title III. Congress created a private right of action
for citizens who face inaccessible public accommodations and charged
the DOJ with responsibility for investigating and pursuing Title III
complaints. Both of these avenues are largely unavailable, however, to
deaf and hard of hearing individuals whose rights are violated by an
attorney. Legislative action must be taken if the original avenues for
enforcement are to be reopened. Congress must take the following three
steps in order to revive the now impotent Title III into the tool Congress
intended to create when it passed the ADA.
1.

Mandatory Government Enforcement

The DOJ must aggressively pursue Title III complaints if the rights
afforded by Title III are to have any meaning. The ADA would not be
the first civil rights legislation that Congress has revisited in order to
ensure achievement of its goals. For example, Congress amended the
Fair Housing Act252 in 1988 after concluding that the Act, as it was
originally designed, was not proving to be effective. The amendment
requires “enforcement by the Attorney General [AG] when the Secretary
of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ‘determines that reasonable
cause exists to believe that a discriminatory housing practice has
occurred or is about to occur’ and a complainant chooses judicial rather
than administrative relief.”253 Although enforcement of the FHA is still
subject to the HUD Secretary’s determinations, the mandatory
enforcement scheme did improve the system by which private parties
and the Attorney General bring civil actions.254 Professor Ruth Colker
has suggested that adopting this required enforcement scheme “would
create a significant improvement in ADA compliance.”255
When Congress passed the ADA, they chose to adopt the CRA’s
enforcement and remedial scheme in Title III and hoped that it would
prove successful. We now have ample evidence that the “time-tested
NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 12, at 12.
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (2006).
253
Colker, ADA Title III, supra note 94, at 378–79 (quoting Pub. L. 100-430, § 8(2), 102 Stat.
1619, 1619, 1628(1988) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3610(g)(2)(A) (1994)) (inserting
section 810(g)(2)(A))). But cf. DOJ TITLE III MANUAL, supra note 56, at III-8.1000(2)
(discussing claims only pursued at the Attorney General’s discretion and only when there
is “reasonable cause to believe that there is a pattern or practice of discrimination, or
discrimination that raises an issue of general public importance”).
254
H.R. REP. NO. 100-711, at 33 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2194.
255
Colker, ADA Title III, supra note 94, at 412.
251
252
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incentives for compliance and disincentives for discrimination”256 that
were successful for the CRA did not succeed, with equal force, in the
ADA. Voluntary Title III compliance has not been achieved,257 making
mandatory government enforcement a necessity. Just as it did with the
FHA, Congress should revisit the ADA and enhance the statutory
government enforcement provisions.
Under an amended ADA, the DOJ would be required to conduct at
least an initial investigation of every individual Title III complaint.
Congress would also need to allocate more financial and human
resources to the DOJ for Title III enforcement. In 2007, the National
Council on Disabilities, in a comprehensive report on the
implementation of the ADA, noted that the “DOJ should devote
substantially more resources and time to investigation of Title III
complaints, especially those regarding small businesses, in light of
widespread
noncompliance
by
these
covered
entities.”258
Noncompliance by lawyers at small firms and solo practices will likely
continue absent a legislative mandate that the DOJ take every claim
seriously by at least conducting a preliminary investigation. Lawyers
must know that there is a threat of DOJ action for noncompliance,
otherwise they have little incentive to comply in the first place.
The argument for additional resources is likely to be met with some
resistance, especially in light of the recent financial crisis. Even though
resources are tight, Congress created a statutorily vested right and now
has the responsibility to ensure that the right is not being violated. Title
III vests the deaf and hard of hearing community with the right to
accessible legal counsel. Congress, therefore, has an obligation to revisit
Title III’s enforcement scheme in order to ensure that the rights afforded
by Title III exist in reality, rather than in theory. Furthermore, DOJ
enforcement must be increased alongside the adoption of a
compensatory damages remedy for private action. A compensatory
damages remedy will encourage more private actions, and thus take
some of the pressure off the DOJ.
2.

The Importance of Monetary Damages

If the rights conferred by Title III are to have any meaning, they
“must be defended from intrusion or violation,” which often requires the

136 CONG. REC. 17,376 (1990) (statement of Sen. Robert Dole).
NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 12, at 169 (“[T]here is
general acknowledgement that many public accommodations are not in compliance with
Title III and are not, in fact, accessible.”).
258
Id. at 17.
256
257
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willingness of an individual to pursue a private action.259 Twenty years
of experience with Title III have proven what Senator Harkin knew from
the start: “without the existence of damages as a remedy, you would not
get widespread voluntary compliance or negotiated settlements, short of
litigation.”260
The remedies available under Title III should be amended so that
monetary damages awards are available in private actions.261 Monetary
damages should take the form of both compensatory and punitive
damages. Damages are a “well-established remedy” for wrongful
conduct.262 Senator Harkin recognized the need for a compensatory
damages remedy in Title III when he proposed a revised version of the
ADA which allowed for compensatory damages.263 Although he
acquiesced to the removal of compensatory damages from the final
version of the ADA in order to gain support for a broader definition of
public accommodation, it was not without the understanding that the
issue may need to be revisited in the future.264 That time is now.
Compensatory damages are already available in actions brought by
the DOJ; therefore, it is not a stretch to also allow compensatory damages
in private Title III actions.265 Furthermore, compensatory damages are
already available under the other two major components of the ADA:
Title I266 and Title II.267 A deaf or hard of hearing person who encounters
an inaccessible attorney has two means of recourse: file a complaint with
the DOJ or find another attorney willing to sue the inaccessible attorney.
Compensatory damages in private actions play an important role in both
of these options. First, it will relieve the DOJ of the burden of being the
only avenue by which an aggrieved party can receive any monetary

Waterstone, New Vision, supra note 81, at 441.
COLKER, DISABILITY PENDULUM, supra note 17, at 181 (quoting Americans with Disability
Act of 1989, Hearings on S. 933 Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the S. Labor & Human
Resources Comm., 101st Cong. 209 (1989) (statement of Sen. Tom Harkin)).
261
See Waterstone, Untold Story, supra note 7, at 1870 (“[S]erious consideration needs to
be given to revisiting [Title III’s] remedial structure.”); see also NAT’L COUNCIL ON
DISABILITY, IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 12, at 202–03. See generally Courtney Abbott Hill,
Note, Enabling the ADA: Why Monetary Damages Should be a Remedy Under Title III of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 101 (2008) (advocating for the addition
of monetary damages to Title III’s remedial scheme).
262
Rudovsky, supra note 154, at 1213.
263
See supra text accompanying note 18.
264
See supra text accompanying notes 26–27.
265
42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(2)(C) (2006) (providing for compensatory damages “not
exceeding $50,000 for a first violation; and not exceeding $100,000 for any subsequent
violation” in Title III actions brought by the DOJ (statutory numbering omitted)).
266
Id. § 12117(a).
267
Id. § 12133.
259
260
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compensation.268 Second, the availability of monetary damages will
incentivize attorneys to take on Title III plaintiffs who, in the face of
increasingly limited attorney’s fees awards, are otherwise unattractive
clients.
Punitive damages, although likely to be awarded in only a small
number of cases, are nevertheless necessary as they “will provide more
of an incentive for private individuals to litigate their claims and for
private attorneys to take more Title III cases.”269 Increasing the
perceived cost of noncompliance will create an additional incentive for
compliance. Amending federal civil rights legislation to increase the
amount of punitive damages available is not new territory. Congress
recognized the need to revisit monetary damages provisions in civil
rights legislation when it amended the FHA. The FHA Amendments
removed the punitive damage cap of $1,000 that existed under the
original FHA. The House Judiciary Committee Report found “that the
limit on punitive damages served as a major impediment to imposing an
effective deterrent on violators and a disincentive for private persons to
bring suits under existing law.”270 There is ample evidence suggesting
that the same lack of deterrence and disincentives exist under the current
version of Title III.271
The availability of monetary damages under Title III also eliminates
the justiciability problems faced by many Title III plaintiffs.272 Under the
current law, “[c]ourts have repeatedly concluded that they lacked
jurisdiction to hear ADA Title III cases, because plaintiffs’ individual
instances of discrimination did not create standing to seek injunctive
relief.”273 Courts will no longer face the lack of jurisdiction dilemma that
results from Title III’s current injunctive-relief-only remedial scheme.
Once monetary damages are available, deaf and hard of hearing
plaintiffs will not have to choose between suing their attorney and
foregoing their rights because they have hired a new attorney.
Additionally, plaintiffs will no longer run the risk that a defendant will
moot their claim by coming into compliance on the eve of trial. While a
claim for injunctive relief will be mooted if the complained-of behavior
ceases, a claim for monetary damages will survive despite a defendant’s
late-in-the-game compliance.

Id. § 12188.
Hill, supra note 261, at 120.
270
H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 40 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2201.
271
See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 12, at 179–86
(discussing “[r]easons for “[w]idespread [n]oncompliance with Title III”).
272
See COLKER, DISABILITY PENDULUM, supra note 17, at 184.
273
Colker, ADA Title III, supra note 94, at 395.
268
269
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Reviving the Catalyst Theory by Redefining Prevailing Parties

Lastly, in response to the Court’s decision in Buckhannon, Congress
should pass legislation explicitly defining prevailing parties. Congress
should reject the Court’s view that prevailing parties, for the purpose of
attorney’s fee awards, only exist in situations where a “judicially
sanctioned change [has occurred] in the legal relationship of the
parties.”274 Instead, Congress should add to Title III a definition of
prevailing party that allows for an attorney’s fee award under the
catalyst theory. The catalyst theory requires that courts apply the “three
thresholds” test advocated by Justice Ginsburg in her Buckhannon
dissent.275 Congress should amend Title III, as follows, to reflect the
“three thresholds” test definition:
A prevailing party is a party that crosses the following
thresholds:
(1) “the claim [is] colorable rather than groundless;”
(2) “the lawsuit [is] a substantial rather than an
insubstantial cause of the defendant’s change in
conduct;”
(3) “the defendant’s change in conduct was
motivated by the plaintiff’s threat of victory rather than
threat of expense.”276
A redefinition of prevailing parties to align with the catalyst theory
will ensure that “aggrieved individuals [are] not left to worry, and
wrongdoers [are] not led to believe, that strategic maneuvers by
defendants might succeed in averting a fee award.”277 Congress’s
explicit rejection of the Court’s decision in Buckhannon will confirm what
Justice Ginsburg asserted in her dissent: that “the ‘catalyst rule,’ as
applied by the clear majority of Federal Circuits, is a key component of
the fee-shifting statutes Congress adopted to advance enforcement of
274
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S.
598, 605 (2001).
275
Id. at 628 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
276
Id. at 610 (majority decision). The Buckhannon majority rejected the catalyst theory,
and thus the application of the “three thresholds” test which it requires, because they felt
the test was “not a formula for ‘ready administrability.’” Id. (quoting Burlington v. Dague,
505 U.S. 557, 566 (1992)). However, as the Buckhannon dissent points out, the catalyst rule
and the implementing standards (the “three thresholds” test), were “developed over
decades and in legions of federal-court decisions.” Id. at 628 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In
fact, before the Court’s decision in Buckhannon, the catalyst rule was being applied “by the
clear majority of Federal Circuits.” Id. at 623.
277
Id. at 636 n.10.
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civil rights.”278 A monetary damages provision ensures that the private
right of action provided for by Title III is not completely undermined,
aggrieved parties are able to pursue private actions, and disability-based
discrimination is further eradicated.279
V. CONCLUSION
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act showed great promise
when it was enacted and has resulted in some significant change.
However, the ADA has also been regarded as being “a symbolic stab at
protecting the rights of persons with disabilities and attempting to end
discrimination.”280 Many of the rights afforded by Title III remain
illusory because people are unable to enforce them. As a practical
matter, many deaf people are unable to retain lawyers for critical legal
matters including criminal law proceedings, family law issues, probate,
and employment law matters.
There must be change in order to achieve what Congress initially
envisioned—compliance by public accommodations including the offices
of lawyers.281 With a coordinated effort, however, change is not only
possible but achievable. Three key things must occur. First, lawyers
must be better educated about their obligations under Title III of the
ADA. Second, state-based Communication Access Funds must be
created to ensure that attorneys are able to fund the provision of the
auxiliary aids and services required under Title III. Lastly, Congress
must make legislative changes to strengthen Title III’s enforcement both
by the government and through private actions. These changes will
move us significantly closer to a day where deaf and hard of hearing
individuals will find accessible counsel the norm rather than the
exception.
These changes, however, should mark the beginning—not the end—
of the effort to make Title III’s goals a reality. Deaf and hard of hearing
individuals will still face challenges. Most people do not know the law
well enough to realize that an attorney might be wrong when they claim
not to be regulated by Title III. An attorney can still refuse to represent a

Id. at 623.
See Waterstone, New Vision, supra note 81, at 444 (arguing that Buckhannon created a
“judicially imposed limitation [which] has undermined the ability of the private attorney
general to bring cases for injunctive relief”).
280
JACQUELINE VAUGHN SWITZER, DISABLED RIGHTS: AMERICAN DISABILITY POLICY AND
THE FIGHT FOR EQUALITY 144 (2003). Title III, as enacted, does not have the teeth necessary
to compel compliance. See id. at 130–31.
281
See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (2006) (setting forth an attorney’s office as a public
accommodation).
278
279
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client without providing a reason. These challenges cannot be resolved
in one fell swoop. Instead, changing the landscape of legal accessibility
requires systematic and deliberate steps towards complete Title III
compliance.
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